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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in Plaintiffs' opening brief is
accurate and fairly stated according to the requirement that
this court give deference to the Industrial Commission's
findings.

The statement of facts propounded in defendant's

brief goes beyond the evidence and reasonable inferences.
Overton suggests in several places that alcohol was not the
cause of the accident.

He also states that the "Investigating

Officer's Report of Traffic Accident" indicates "many other
possible causes" of defendant's accident.

However, the record

indicates that the Officer's Report limited the contributing
factors which caused Overton's accident to driving under the
influence of alcohol, speeding, and driving left of center.
(R. at 335.) Any other factors on which defendant relies as
alternative causes are best characterized as only conditions.
Overton's suggestion that alcohol did not cause the
accident is contradicted by the record which demonstrates
that:

(1) Overton consumed a substantial quantity of alcohol

before the accident (R. at 336); (2) hospital records show
intoxication as leading to the accident (R. at 240); (3) police
officers charged Overton with driving under the influence of
alcohol (R. at 57, 336); (4) Overton paid the fine for driving
under the influence of alcohol (R. at 57, 97); and (5) Overton
has a substantial history of alcohol abuse.

(R. at 85-87.)

Administrative Law Judge Janet L. Moffit found that even though
"there was no proof that [Overton] lost control of the vehicle
by intoxication, . . .
316.)

it undoubtedly played some role." (R. at

Every entity or individual that had any connection with

Overton's accident found that it was alcohol-related.

See

Plaintiffs' opening brief at Point III.
Overton also contends that he did not concede that there
should be a 15% reduction in workers' compensation benefits for
his alcohol-caused accident.

(Defendant's brief, p. 5.) The

record does not support defendant's contention.

Rather, the

cited testimony of Overton's counsel Ms. Diana (R. at 42.)
coupled with the Overton's complete failure to challenge the
reduction which had been made from the beginning (R. at 34, 39)
evidence that Overton conceded that the 15% reduction of
compensation was appropriate.
Defendant, without support from the record, also maintains
that "Overton had the presence of mind to start the truck up
again to drive himself back to Duchesne to seek medical attention." (Defendant's brief, p.4.) Overton's testimony contradicts this statement.
began to roll over.

"[T]he next thing I knew the vehicle
I have no further memory of this event

until I was speaking to a Duchesne police officer.
336.)

(R. at

"[I]t seemed like I lost consciousness or something.

Because then the next thing I do know was that I was being
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pulled over by either the Sheriff or one of his deputies."
at 96-97.)

Overton had no presence of mind.

medical attention.

(R.

Nor did he seek

The Sheriff requested it for him.

(R. at

58.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REQUIRING THAT DEFENDANT'S
INTOXICATION BE WILLFUL IN ORDER TO INVOKE
THE 15% REDUCTION OF COMPENSATION IMPOSED BY
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-14.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "when there is purely
a question of law presented, which is necessarily involved in
the decision or the award, it is [the appellate court's] duty
to determine that question." McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial
Commission, 598 P.2d 375, 376 (Utah 1979).

In the instant

case, Administrative Law Judge, Janet L. Moffit, addressed the
legal issue of whether or not Section 35-1-14 requires "willful
intoxication" to impose a 15% benefit reduction of compensation.

Judge Moffit concluded that the 15% reduction did not

apply to this matter because the "statute [§ 35-1-14] implies
that willful conduct on the part of an employee is necessary."
(R. at 316).
This type of statutory interpretation, by necessity, concerns "a question of law involved in the decision or award."
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McKay Dee Hospital, 598 P.2d at 376.

Therefore, because the

Commission's central justification for not invoking the 15%
reduction was the finding that Overton was not "willfully"
intoxicated, this issue is subject to full review by this Court.
Section 35-1-14 provides in pertinent part that:

"Where

injury is caused from the intoxication of the employee, compensation provided for herein shall be reduced fifteen percent
. . ."

The plain meaning of this statutory language is a

legislative condemnation of intoxication of any kind in
connection with work-related accidents.

In any event, it is

difficult to see how the court might determine that an
individual has become willfully intoxicated as opposed to
unwillfully intoxicated.
In interpreting the meaning of Section 35-1-14, it is
important to note that both Utah law and general principals of
statutory construction demand that statutes be read according
to their plain meaning.

Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc. 575

P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).

Departure from the literal

language and meaning of a statute is not justified when it
produces absurd or unjust results.

2A Sutherland Stat. Const.

§ 45.12.
To infer that intoxication must be "willful," where such
language is not used to describe intoxication, constitutes an
unjustified departure from the literal language and meaning of
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Section 35-1-14.

Overton suggests that because intoxication is

included within the same statutory provision as "willful
failures to use safety devices" and "willful failure to follow
safety rules" the provision infers that intoxication must also
be willful.

However, the fact that the term "willful" is not

used in the description of intoxication, while it was noticeably included within the description of each other separate
type of conduct indicates that the term was not intended to
modify intoxication.

Utah law supports this plain meaning

interpretation.
In Lopez v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 660 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that intoxication alone is
sufficient to reduce a claimant's award if the claimant's
accident is casually related to his intoxication.
ment of willfulness was ever mentioned.

No require-

Contrary to Overton's

contention, the Lopez decision is directly on point because it
interprets the application of Section 35-1-14 with respect to
intoxication.

If "willfulness" were required, the Lopez Court

would have to have found that Lopez was willfully, deliberately
and defiantly intoxicated before his award could be reduced.
Such a finding was not made in Lopez because the statute
contains no such requirement with respect to intoxication.
Overton's argument that Van Waters and Rogers v. Workman,
700 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1985) requires willful intoxication fails.
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Workman considers a 15% reduction for "willful failure to use
safety devices."

In Workman, both sides agreed that the

statute required "willful failure."
constituted "willful failure."

The issue was what

Intoxication was not an issue.

The Industrial Commission committed reversibLe error by
requiring that Overton's intoxication be willful in order to
invoke a 15% reduction of compensation.
POINT II
THE FACTS COMPEL A FINDING THAT OVERTON'S
INJURIES WERE CAUSED FROM HIS INTOXICATION.
Defendant Overton contends that his intoxication was not
the proximate cause of his accident.

The definition of

proximate cause is helpful in demonstrating that Overton's
analysis is flawed:
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act,
or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played
a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1103 (5th Ed. 1979).

The

overwhelming evidence coupled with Overton's own
acknowledgement of his consumption of substantial amounts of
alcohol demand the conclusion that Overton's accident was
proximately caused by intoxication.
As discussed in plaintiff's opening brief, no proof of
causation was attempted because the 15% reduction was not
challenged until the entry of the Industrial Commission's
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Order.

Nevertheless, the existing record demonstrates:

(1)

Overton's admitting physician reported that he was "ETOH" and
diagnosed his condition as "ETOH."

(R. at 248); (2) Overton

was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (R. at
335); (3) Overton expected conviction for the DUI charge, so he
paid the $300 fine (R. at 57); and (4) Overton had a history of
substantial drug/alcohol abuse.

(R. at 85-87.)

POINT III
BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE 15%
REDUCTION OF COMPENSATION WENT UNCHALLENGED
AND WAS NOT CONSIDERED UNTIL THE COMMISSION'S
FINAL ORDER WAS ENTERED, FAIRNESS REQUIRES
THAT PLAINTIFFS BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THIS ISSUE.
The 15% reduction of benefits had been taken by the
employer without objection.

The Administrative Law Judge

outlined the issues before the hearing which did not include
the 15% reduction.
34.)

Overton did not challenge this.

(R. at

When asked by the Judge at the hearing to identify

additional issues, Overton did not identify the 15% reduction
as an issue.

(R. at 39.)

When the employer stated that there

was no dispute that a 15% reduction was applicable, Overton did
not disagree.

(R. at 42.)

Overton offers absolutely no

explanation for not challenging the 15% intoxication reduction
when asked twice to identify disputed issues.

Moreover, he

offers no explanation for failing to refute the 15% reduction
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when plaintiff represented to the Industrial Commission at the
hearing that there was no dispute about the 15% reduction.
at 42.)

(R.

The reasonable conclusion is that Overton conceded

that the reduction was proper.
Had Overton challenged the reduction, it would be reasonable to expect presentation of the evidence.

However, because

the reduction was never challenged, raised or disputed, failure
to present substantial evidence was justified.

When the issue

is identified as undisputed and the only response is "thank
you," failure to offer further proof on the issue is excusable.

To penalize plaintiffs for an alleged failure to offer

additional evidence on a matter not at issue promotes surprise
and unfairness.

Plaintiffs respectfully encourage this Court

to avoid such an unjust result.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons- stated herein, plaintiffs respectfully
request this court to enter its Order that:

(1) the Industrial

Commission committed reversible error in requiring that intoxication be willful to impose a 15% reduction of compensation;
(2) Overton's accident was caused from his intoxication; and
(3) if additional evidence is necessary, that plaintiffs be
granted a remand to present such evidence.
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it day of March, 1987.
DATED this JJD_
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Larry R. Laycock
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
SCMLRL3 5
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